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Abstract: Since it is paramount that the rights and welfare of evaluation participants 
and stakeholders be respected, we argue that the abilities and knowledge necessary 
to appropriately safeguard data ought to be considered an essential competence for 
evaluators. Building from past contributions, and in consultation with research 
ethics and data security experts from our home institution, recommended practices 
in the collection, handling, and storage of evaluation data were identified. A three-
dimensional framework for secure data handling was developed, considering type 
of information handled, harm posed by a potential confidentiality breach, and cor­
responding steps to securing confi dential information. 
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Resumé : Comme il est primordial que les droits et le bien-être des participants à 
l'évaluation et des parties prenantes soient respectés, nous soutenons que les capaci­
tés et les connaissances nécessaires à la protection des données sont essentielles à la 
pratique évaluative. À partir d’expériences antérieures et en consultation avec des 
experts en éthique de la recherche et en sécurité des données de notre établissement, 
les meilleures pratiques en matière de collecte, de traitement et d’entreposage des 
données d'évaluation ont été recueillies. Un cadre tridimensionnel pour le traite­
ment sécurisé des données a été mis au point afin de consigner ces pratiques recom­
mandées. Ce cadre tient compte du type d’information traité, du préjudice causé 
par un bris potentiel de confidentialité et des étapes pour protéger la confi dentialité 
de l’information. 
Mots clés : compétences, gestion des données, sécurité des données, évaluation de 
programmes
 In The Program Evaluation Standards, Yarbrough, Shulha, Hopson, and Caruthers 
(2011 ) identify a variety of standards and competencies for evaluators. Although 
some standards emphasize the importance of information accuracy, relevancy, 
and respect of privacy (e.g., standards A5 Information Management, U5 Rel­
evant Information, and P3 Human Rights and Respect), few standards relate to 
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evaluators’ roles and responsibilities in ensuring that they appropriately and se­
curely handle confidential information collected during the course of evaluations. 
For example, standard A5, Information Management, includes a section on stor­
ing information, emphasizing the need for accurate and quality information stor­
age, without invoking the need for secure storage. Since it is essential to respect 
and protect the rights and welfare of participants and communities in evaluations 
( Yarbrough et al., 2011 ), we believe that secure data handling and management 
of confidential information should be considered a core evaluation competence. 
 The Centre for Research on Educational and Community Services (CRECS) 
is an evaluation and applied research centre in the Faculty of Social Sciences at the 
University of Ottawa. In 2008, CRECS developed a manual to inform its evalua­
tors and researchers on guidelines to collect, safeguard, and work with confi den­
tial data (Olson, Aubry, & Morier, 2008). In the almost 10 years since, the capacity 
to collect, share, and store data electronically has grown greatly. At the same time, 
there have been many stories of failures to properly safeguard confidential data by 
government agencies and by some of the largest private companies. Th ese stories 
may lead to some uncertainty among evaluators, researchers, and students regard­
ing the proper steps to follow when collecting, sharing, and storing data. Th is 
topic is particularly important in the context of our centre, which has a history of 
research and evaluation involving marginalized and vulnerable people. In the ab­
sence of clear institutional guidelines, CRECS undertook to develop guidelines for 
our researchers and evaluators. While there have been recent calls for researchers 
to enhance their research data-management skills to account for rapidly evolving 
data-sharing environments ( Corti & Van den Eynden, 2015 ), we extend this call 
by encouraging evaluators to develop their skills in data management too. 
For the purpose of this article, we define “evaluator” as a person who is col­
lecting primary data or using secondary data for the purposes of conducting an 
evaluation. This can extend to any person who is part of an evaluation team or 
who will come into contact with data. “Data” can include a range of information 
collected on and by individuals or about program processes or outcomes. In this 
article, our primary concern is with confidential data with a particular focus on 
electronic data. However, most of the principles we outline can easily be extended 
to other forms of data. 
In this paper, we present a three-dimensional framework to assist evaluators 
in making decisions regarding the handling of their data. We employed the fol­
lowing approach in developing our framework and producing recommendations 
for secure data handling: 
1. 	 we conducted an online search for best practices using terms such as 
“policy data security,” “privacy policy,” and “data security”; 
2. 	 we reviewed relevant ethical codes, both nationally and by discipline; 
3. 	 we examined the websites of the Privacy Commissioners of Ontario and 
Canada; 
4. 	 we consulted librarians specializing in data management; 
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5. 	 we consulted the University of Ottawa data security architect; 
6. 	 we presented and obtained feedback on draft findings from the Uni­
versity of Ottawa evaluators, researchers, students, and research ethics 
protocol offi  cers. 
We believe it is essential that organizations have clear guidelines to equip 
evaluators with the knowledge, abilities, and resources to appropriately safeguard 
data and minimize the risk of a confidentiality breach. Further, we argue that clear 
institutional-level guidelines must accompany access to appropriate resources 
(e.g., relevant software) as well as training to use such resources. For those work­
ing alone, or in a private evaluation practice, we view it equally important to de­
velop consistent practices and provide sufficient resources to protect confi dential 
data. We hope that the information we provide in this article may inform deci­
sions that all evaluators may adopt in their practices. 
APPLICABLE ETHICAL CODES AND LAWS 
Evaluators work in different contexts and therefore may have different statutes or 
legislation dictating rules of compliance. They may be members of diff erent as­
sociations, each of which may have its own guidelines or regulations concerning 
the handling of confidential information. This section provides a brief overview 
of applicable ethical codes and laws, starting with guidelines provided by the Ca­
nadian Evaluation Society, which are relevant to all Canadian evaluators. Next, 
we provide an overview of the Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct for 
Research Involving Humans (TCPS 2), and the Personal Information Protection 
and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA), each of which would apply to those 
working in particular institutional settings or to evaluators using previously col­
lected research data for evaluation purposes. 
Canadian Evaluation Society 
 The Canadian Evaluation Society provides ethical guidelines for its members, 
divided into three sections: competence, integrity, and accountability. Th eir guide­
lines emphasize that evaluations should be designed and conducted in a manner 
that protects the rights (including the right to privacy) and welfare of all partici­
pants, but they off er no further specifics for the protection of confi dential data. 
They stress that evaluators should act with integrity and confer with clients on 
contractual decisions such as confidentiality, privacy, and ownership of fi ndings 
and reports ( Canadian Evaluation Society, 2014 ). 
Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct for Research Involving 
Humans (TCPS 2) 
 The Tri-Council Policy Statement is a joint policy initiated by the presidents of 
Canada’s three federal research agencies (Canadian Institutes of Health Research 
[CIHR], Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council [NSERC], and 
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Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council [SSHRC]). The objective of the 
policy statement is to express the agencies’ commitment to the promotion of the 
ethical conduct of research involving humans in Canada. The agency occasionally 
updates these guidelines. This review uses the version of the Tri-Council Policy 
Statement published in December of 2014 ( TCPS 2, 2014 ). The policy statement 
asserts that individuals should design research with the inclusion of safeguards 
to ensure the privacy of participants and measures that protect confi dentiality. 
Although the policy does emphasize the importance of taking necessary precau­
tions to address privacy and confidentiality issues, it does not specify further what 
those precautions ought to entail and under what circumstances. 
According to the TCPS 2, individuals must outline any exceptions to privacy 
and confidentiality, whether legal or ethical, in the process of free and informed 
consent and be approved by a Research Ethics Board (REB) prior to beginning 
data collection, unless the information is publicly available. According to Arti­
cle 2.5 of the policy, when conducting non-research activities such as program 
evaluation, quality assurance and quality improvement studies, or performance 
reviews, approval by an REB is not necessary. However, it is common that indi­
viduals may subsequently use data originally collected for such activities later 
for research purposes. According to the policy, this is considered secondary use 
of information not originally intended for research and may require REB review 
( TCPS 2, 2014 ) 
Evaluators who rely exclusively on secondary use of non-identifi able infor­
mation are not required to seek participant consent but are required to seek REB 
review. Identifiability can be context specific (e.g., use of coded information is 
considered non-identifiable only if a researcher or evaluator does not have access 
to the key) and consent from participants for secondary use of identifi able infor­
mation is not always necessary if there is REB approval (for more about secondary 
use of information see Articles 5.5 and 5.6 of the  TCPS 2, 2014 ). Tri-Council re­
quirements can be useful to evaluators since there is often a lot of overlap between 
research and evaluation activities. Much of what the policy statement covers is 
useful in an evaluative context, especially related to secondary use of research data 
or use of evaluation data for research. 
Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act 
(PIPEDA) 
PIPEDA is a five-part federal statute covering the management of personal in­
formation for private-sector organizations during the course of their commercial 
activity; the statute and its provincial counterparts may apply to certain evalua­
tion projects. The statute focuses on the protection of personal information in 
the private sector and handling of electronic documents. PIPEDA sets out 10 
“fair information principles” outlining basic privacy obligations under the law, 
which include accountability, identifying purposes, consent, limiting collection, 
limiting use, accuracy, safeguards, openness, individual access, and recourse ( Of­
fice of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, 2015 ). The statute outlines broad 
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responsibilities related to protection of electronic data but does not go further in 
specifying appropriate means to safeguard electronic data. 
Evaluators should be familiar with its principles and be aware of any similar 
provincial statutes. Several provincial statutes have been deemed “substantially 
similar” to PIPEDA, including those of British Columbia, Alberta, Quebec, On­
tario, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland and Labrador. Organiza­
tions subject to provincial legislation deemed substantially similar to PIPEDA 
are exempt from PIPEDA with respect to the collection, use, and disclosure of 
personal information within their province ( Office of the Privacy Commissioner 
of Canada, 2013 ). 
PRESCRIBING APPROPRIATE DATA-HANDLING PRACTICES: A 
MODERN CHALLENGE 
While institutions and associations may have general guidelines regarding secure 
data handling, it is up to evaluators to exercise their judgement in deciding what 
practices to implement and when to implement them. Evaluators may feel ill-
equipped for this decision making if they have not received training or do not 
have access to resources to make decisions regarding their data and its safeguard­
ing. For example, guidelines may instruct an evaluator to “password-protect 
sensitive data,” leaving them to decide for themselves what constitutes suffi  ciently 
“sensitive” data to warrant password protection. Moreover, an evaluator may be 
unsure about whether, and at what point, they should encrypt a document (and, 
of course, how to encrypt it and what software to use). This illustrates how a 
seemingly simple directive, to password-protect sensitive data, requires that an 
evaluator make many decisions about how exactly and in what context to execute 
the directive. 
A THREE-DIMENSIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR SECURE DATA 
HANDLING 
We argue that the abilities and knowledge necessary to make decisions related to 
appropriately safeguarding data ought to be an essential competence for evalu­
ators. This would mean that such abilities and knowledge ought to be part of an 
evaluator’s basic training. Evaluators work across a broad range of contexts with 
different types of data, serving a diverse range of clients. We have developed a 
framework to aid in the understanding of the nature of one’s data to ensure that 
evaluators and program stakeholders take proper steps to safeguard their evalu­
ative data. 
Having consulted data handling experts, and reviewed relevant literature, we 
have come up with a three-dimensional framework for data handling. First, we 
consider the type of information handled (the extent to which data is identifying), 
next, the harm associated with a potential breach of confidentiality, and fi nally, 
the extent to which an evaluator should secure their data. We believe that our 
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three-dimensional framework is applicable at an individual level, when an evalu­
ator is working on a specific project, as well as at an institutional level if they are 
developing their own procedures for secure data handling. 
Understanding and identifying types of information 
When an evaluator handles personal information, its source may have a reason­
able expectation of privacy. When acquiring or working with data, it is important 
to determine the type of data before considering steps to safeguard them. Th e 
TCPS 2 (2014 ) has identified the following five categories to assess the extent to 
which researchers can use information to identify a participant, all of which we 
believe are also valuable for evaluators: 
Directly identifying information—the information identifies a specifi c indi­
vidual through direct identifiers (e.g., name, social insurance number, 
personal health number). 
Indirectly identifying information—the information can reasonably be 
expected to identify an individual through a combination of indirect 
identifiers (e.g., date of birth, place of residence, or unique personal 
characteristic). 
Coded information—direct identifiers are removed from the information 
and replaced with a code. Depending on access to the code, it may be 
possible to re-identify specific participants (e.g., the principal investiga­
tor retains a list that links the participants’ code names with their actual 
name so data can be re-linked if necessary). 
Anonymized information—the information is irrevocably stripped of direct 
identifi ers, a code is not kept to allow future re-linkage, and risk of re-
identification of individuals from remaining indirect identifiers is low 
or very low. 
Anonymous information—the information never had identifi ers associated 
with it (e.g., anonymous surveys) and risk of identification of individuals 
is low or very low. (p. 59) 
Ethical concerns regarding privacy decrease as data move on the continuum from 
directly identifiable information toward anonymous information (TCPS 2). When 
possible, it is best to collect data as low on the above list as possible; anonymous or 
anonymized data will keep the risk of re-identification of data low. Challenges in 
anonymizing data are amplified in sensitive contexts where balancing the integrity 
of the data with participant anonymity can be challenging ( Saunders, Kitzinger, 
& Kitzinger, 2015 ). Indeed, evaluators often keep their data in an identifi able 
form, or have no choice but to collect identifi able data (e.g., if identifi able char­
acteristics are directly evaluated or if follow-up with participants is necessary). In 
instances where this is the case, an evaluator ought to endeavour to de-identify or 
anonymize their data as soon as possible. 
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Assessing the risk of a possible confi dentiality breach 
It is important that evaluators assess the extent to which data carry a risk of harm 
to a participant if anyone were to disclose their data to an unauthorized party, 
thereby breaching their confidentiality. Not all information of the same type car­
ries the same risk associated with a breach. For example, indirectly identifying 
information such as the address of a worker at a fast-food restaurant participat­
ing in an evaluation of the restaurant’s recycling practices is very diff erent from 
the address of a resident participating in the evaluation of a low-income housing 
program who revealed they sell drugs to pay their rent. Although in both in­
stances the information collected is indirectly identifying, the consequences of a 
confidentiality breach of the former would be far less damaging than the latter, 
where the resident may experience serious consequences such as loss of housing 
or criminal liability. Therefore, in addition to considering the type of data an  
evaluator is working with, it is imperative that they also consider the risk of harm 
associated with a data breach. Based on the Harvard Information Security Policy’s 
five data security levels ( Harvard Information Security, n.d. ), we have developed 
four levels of risk associated with evaluation data. 
1.	 Low-risk confi dential information . This level refers to information 
that in its present form would not likely cause harm to an individual or 
group if disclosed, which evaluators have nevertheless decided to keep 
confidential. Information at this level may include anonymous informa­
tion, anonymized information, or coded information that if de-coded 
and disclosed would not cause serious harm to an individual or group. 
Examples include anonymous survey data, completely anonymized data, 
unpublished intellectual property (e.g., manuscript draft s). 
2. 	Sensitive confi dential information . This level refers to information 
that if disclosed in its present form can reasonably be expected to cause 
some damage to an individual’s reputation, or cause embarrassment. 
Information at this level may include low-risk data that has not yet been 
anonymized and coded information that if de-coded and disclosed could 
cause harm to an individual or group. Examples include bank account 
numbers, student records (e.g., transcript), and information supplied in 
confi dence. 
3. 	 Information that would likely cause harm if disclosed . Information 
at this level includes information that if disclosed in its present form 
could create a risk of social, psychological, reputational, fi nancial, legal, 
or other harm to an individual or group. This level may include sensitive 
data that has not yet been anonymized or cannot be anonymized because 
confidential information is needed for analysis but that, if disclosed, may 
cause harm to an individual or group. Examples include health card  
information, diagnosis of mental illness, and credit card numbers. 
4. 	 Information that would cause severe harm if disclosed . Information 
at this level includes information that if disclosed in its present form 
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could create a risk of criminal liability, loss of employment, or severe 
harm to an individual or group. This level is for data of the most sensi­
tive nature, and evaluators should anonymize these data as soon as pos­
sible. Highly confidential information that cannot be fully anonymized 
because it is needed for analysis must be handled with extreme care. 
Examples include social insurance numbers and information about il­
legal activity. 
Importantly, we note that examples corresponding to each level above may move 
up or down the scale depending on context. For example, student records may 
remain at the second level if they belong to students registered in a regular class, 
while they may move up to a level three or even four if they were to belong to 
students who self-identified as having cheated in an exam and who have provided 
this information in confidence to an evaluator. 
We emphasize that the best way to avoid a breach of confidentiality is to 
not collect identifying data in the first place; we emphasize that the collection of 
identifying information not relevant to evaluation objectives may unnecessarily 
lead to a higher level of risk associated with a breach. It is therefore imperative 
that evaluators collect only data that are absolutely necessary to reach the goals 
of their projects. 
Practical steps to securing data 
 Aft er an evaluator has had the opportunity to assess the type of data they are 
working with and reflect on the harm associated with a potential confi dentiality 
breach, they can consider what steps they should take to appropriately secure 
their data.  Table 1 provides an overview of steps one can take to secure one’s 
electronic data when considering the level of risk associated with a breach of 
confidentiality (and, by extension, the extent to which data are identifying). 
Since all projects are different, this framework is intended to help evaluators 
decide where their data may fit and what steps they should take to secure their 
data. The purpose of this framework is to encourage evaluators to think of 
their data in this three-dimensional way, in considering the type of data they 
are working with, the risk associated with a confidentiality breach, and steps to 
securing their data based on type and risk. The same principles in the fi rst two 
dimensions (type of data and risk) can apply to non-electronic data as well. Th e 
third, steps to securing data, will not specifi cally apply to non-electronic data, 
but evaluators could nevertheless use it as a guide to consider how they can best 
keep their data secure. 
Table 2 outlines steps for handling electronic data, from first loading data 
onto a computer to secure deletion. First, the evaluator must scan the computer 
or device for malware (short for malicious software) and ensure that the operat­
ing system is up-to-date. Next, evaluators should password-protect confi dential 
data, and encrypt the data when possible. Finally, evaluators should securely de­
lete confidential data using a “file shredding” software. We strongly recommend 
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Table 1. Levels of risk and corresponding steps for safely handling data 
 Level of risk  Steps for securing data 
 1 Low-risk confi ­
dential informa­
tion 
Storage : Data must be stored on a password-protected com­
puter or drive. 
Sharing : It is recommended that files sent via email be 
password-protected. Password must be sent through a diff er­
ent medium. 
 2 Sensitive confi ­
dential informa-
Field collection : Data should be collected on a password-pro­
tected device. 
tion Storage : Data must be password-protected; encryption is 
recommended. 
Sharing : Files sent via email should be password-protected and 
encrypted. Password must be sent through a diff erent medium. 
Use of an organization’s shared drive, however, is preferred to 
email. 
 3 Information that 
would likely cause 
harm if disclosed 
Field collection : Data should be collected on an encrypted and 
password-protected device. Use of paper material is discour­
aged, but if used should be handled with extreme care and not 
left unattended unless in a locked and secure environment. 
 4 Information 
that would cause 
severe harm if 
disclosed 
Storage : Data must be encrypted and password-protected. 
Sharing : Data should not be shared by email. Files must be 
encrypted when using an organization’s shared drive. 
Access : Should be controlled by lead evaluator, who should 
keep a list of individuals who have been granted access to data. 
Field collection : Data should be collected on an encrypted and 
password-protected device. Use of paper material is discour­
aged, but if used should be handled with extreme care and not 
left unattended unless in a locked and secure environment. 
Storage : Data must be stored in a physically locked room 
(preferably secured by an alarm) on a password-protected and 
encrypted hard drive or computer with limited or no connec­
tion to a data network.  
Sharing : Sharing at this level should be limited; data should be 
accessed only in a secure location. 
Access: Should be strictly controlled (e.g., by keeping a list of 
individuals who have been granted access to data.) 
Note. Levels of risk adapted from Harvard Information Security (n.d.) 
that all of these steps be taken when handling any confidential data. Of course, it 
is up to the evaluator to decide on how cautious they should be with their data, 
depending on data type and level of risk. We acknowledge that our examples out­
lined in the two tables (e.g., use of email for data sharing) will not be applicable 
to all, as there are many other alternative ways to handle data (e.g., use of USB 
rather than email) that inevitably present their own challenges. We do, however, 
highlight the fact that the principles remain the same, regardless of medium used 
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Table 2. Steps for securing electronic data 
 Steps Details 
Step 1: Find a 
clean computer / 
First and foremost, it is essential that computers be up-to­
date. System providers release operating system updates 
create a secure 
environment 
on an ongoing basis to protect users against vulnerabilities 
that hackers have identified and exploited. 
Next, it is important to scan computers for malware. To 
be considered secure, a computer should first be scanned 
for malware, and if any threats are detected, they should 
Step 2: Password 
promptly be cleaned or removed. 
After a computer is scanned and threats are removed, an 
protect, encrypt evaluator may load their sensitive data onto the computer 
(e.g., interview recordings, non-anonymized data, etc.). At 
this stage, it is important to de-identify or anonymize data 
to the greatest extent possible and password-protect docu­
ments. It is recommended that the computer’s entire drive 
be encrypted and strongly recommended that the individ-
Step 3: Perma­
nent fi le removal 
ual files be encrypted. 
Files with sensitive information should never be deleted 
using standard “trash bins” installed on computers to 
“remove” files. This only removes the file directory, yet the 
file and its information are still stored physically on the 
computer’s hard drive and remains accessible.  
“File shredding” applications can be used to permanently 
delete files. These programs overwrite the file with random 
letters and/or numbers, often multiple times, before remov­
ing their directory. It is important to note that this applies 
to files that contain sensitive information and are no longer 
needed (e.g., an audio recording that has been transcribed.) 
 A file that has been anonymized and will later be used for 
research does not need to be destroyed; it can simply be 
password protected, and preferably encrypted. 
to manage data. An evaluator ought to be aware of the multiple ways along the 
spectrum of security to handle their data and choose the options most suited to 
their situations. 
Encryption and password protection 
Not all passwords are equally secure, and encryption is useless if someone can 
easily guess the password. Although there may be some debate as to what kind 
of password is most secure, it is often accepted that longer passwords (at least 
eight characters) and with varied characters (upper case, lower case, numbers, 
and special characters) are more secure (more difficult to guess by an individual 
or software designed to crack passwords). We also note that a password should 
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be sent through a different medium than data (e.g., if a password-protected fi le 
is sent by email, the password should not be sent in that same email, but instead 
should be sent by text message, mail, or phone). Passwords should be suffi  ciently 
complex so that they cannot be easily guessed. What is “suffi  ciently complex” 
ought to fit prevailing standards, and the complexity of a password should be 
proportionately greater than the level of risk associated with a potential confi ­
dentiality breach. 
Encryption can be very simple, and many individuals may use devices en­
crypted by default and not even be aware. Full-drive encryption is available 
(and oft en automatically enabled) on Windows computers (Bitlocker) and Mac 
computers (FileVault). However, this may give some a false sense of security, 
since once one is logged on, the system decrypts the data, thus rendering a user’s 
data exposed. Therefore, we recommend file-level encryption for fi les containing 
sensitive data; a range of encryption software is available, from free, open-access 
software to paid professional applications. 
 Data-management plans 
A data management plan (DMP) refers to a document that outlines how evalu­
ators should handle data before, during, and after an evaluation project. A DMP 
can help address many concerns raised in this article and act as a checklist to 
ensure that an evaluator has considered how they will handle the data at every 
stage of the project. A DMP can also be useful in reassuring concerned program 
stakeholders that the evaluator(s) will handle data with care. On projects with 
multiple evaluators and stakeholders, teams can also use the document to ensure 
that everyone is handling data in a consistent manner (e.g., a DMP can outline 
how oft en data should be backed up, in what format data should be saved, and 
how long it is kept before it is securely destroyed). 
 CONCLUSION 
In a constantly evolving environment, having knowledge related to technology, 
especially the secure storage of electronic data, is imperative. We argue that an 
evaluator’s abilities to appropriately secure data is a core evaluation competence, 
and as such it is essential that evaluators be proficient in this area. Akin to the 
reality that an evaluator may spend hours learning a new statistical method re­
quired for an upcoming project, we argue that an evaluator should spend the time 
necessary to learn how to handle the data securely. 
 The responsibility should not rest solely at the level of an individual evaluator 
but extend to an organizational level. Therefore, it is important that associations 
and organizations provide their members with adequate guidelines, instructions, 
and resources to facilitate their capacity to handle data securely. It is essential that 
organizations and associations provide their members with specifi c guidelines 
that consider the type of data, level of risk associated with a possible breach, and 
detailed instructions related to how they should handle data. Implementation of 
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such practices would increase the confidence of concerned program stakeholders 
and add to the integrity of the evaluative process. 
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